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The Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, or the "Principles," seek to "mify and
claify"the law ofsoflware tansactions. The dralfeis, however, excluded "dital content" from
the scope of their project. This Essay explains why the scope of the Principies should
encompass difftal content The exclusion of di&gtal content creates two different but related
problems. The ffrst problem is that it creates what Irefer to as "classification confusion." Given
the complexity and speed of technological innovation, the task of distinguishing digtal content
from soiware may be diffcult for courts The second problem is that it fails to resolve the
conundrun of how to balance the proprietary nghts and interests of hcensor-owneis and the
nghts and interests of licensee-consumes. Thlus conundrum in turn has created problems of
contractual form and user assent that arose out of software transactions but which have much
more troubling applications in other contexts. With (and sometimes, even wfthout) a click of a
mouse, one can relinquish intellectual property, privacy, and expression nghts.
This Essay proposes that the Principles should geneially apply to digital content The
Principles are an impressive accomplishment and go a long way toward unifying and clarifying
the law of sofware tansactions. This Essay urges that they go even further
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The Principles seek to "unify and clarify" the law of software
transactions.' Given the rapid evolution of software technology and,
accordingly, the legal issues surrounding software transactions, the
drafters deemed a restatement of the law to be premature The
Principles aim not to restate the law, but to account for the case law
governing software transactions and to recommend best practices
without "unduly hindering the law's adaptability to future develop-
ments.:
3
Unfortunately, the drafters undermine their own stated objectives
by excluding "digital content" from the scope of their project. The
Principles define digital content as "digital art," which is "literary and
artistic information stored electronically, such as music, photographs,
motion pictures, books, newspapers, and other images and sounds,"
and "digital database," which is a "compilation of facts arranged in a
systematic manner and stored electronically." The exclusion of digital
content creates two related but different problems. The first problem is
what I refer to as "classification confusion." The distinction between
"digital content" and "software" is often unclear and is likely to
become even more blurred over time. Creating such a distinction
discounts the speed of technological evolution. Companies may
rapidly develop offerings that do not neatly fall within the definition of"software." Classification confusion thereby potentially diminishes
the usefulness of the Principles and increases the likelihood of their
misapplication or nonapplication by courts
The second problem with excluding digital content from the
Principles is that it fails to resolve the conundrum posed by software
transactions of how to balance the proprietary rights and interests of
licensor-owners and the rights and interests of licensee-consumers.
This conundrum in turn has directly or indirectly created problems of
contractual form and user assent that arose out of software transactions
but which have much more troubling applications in other contexts.
1. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, introductory
cmt. (2010) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. I use the term "Principles" to refer to both the title
of the project and the provisions themselves. I use the plural form, rather than the singular
one, when referring to the Principles in order to reduce confusion and maintain consistency
with other articles in this Symposium.
2. Id.
3. Id ("Choices must be made if the project is to be successful, and in making such
choices, the Principles seek to adopt best practices.").
4. Id § 1.01(0(2).
5. See discussion hizfa Part IV
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Initially introduced in the context of software transactions, the use of
shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap agreements spread to other
types of transactions and these contracts are now ubiquitous on the
internet. With (and sometimes, even without) a click of a mouse, one
can relinquish intellectual property, privacy, and expression rights.
Given the commonalities between digital content and software-such
as reproducibility and intangibility-contract law issues arising in the
context of software transactions will likely affect contract law issues
involving digital content.
This Essay proposes that the Principles should include within
their scope "digital content." The Principles are an impressive
accomplishment and go a long way toward unifying and clarifying the
law of software transactions. This Essay urges that they go even
further.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PR[NCPLES OF THELA WOF SOFTWARE
CONTRACTS
The drafters of the Pinciples of the Law of Software Contracts
faced the important preliminary task of determining the scope of the
Principles. What types of transactions should the Principles govern?
The drafters focused on software transactions and in doing so created a
line-drawing problem. By categorizing transactions by subject matter,
rather than by the nature of the transaction or contracting method, the
drafters were then forced to define what constitutes software. The
drafters may have thought that they were simply following the example
set by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Article 2 of the UCC
governs sales of goods. "Goods" are defined as tangible, moveable
items.6 Yet, where the subject matter is intangible, dynamic, and
protean, proper classification becomes much more problematic.
The task of properly defining software is made more complicated
because the scope of the Principles is determined solely by subject
matter and not by transaction type. To elaborate on the comparison
with the UCC, Article 2 applies to sales of goods.' The Principles, by
contrast, govern software transactions. The drafters used the generic
term "transactions" to avoid the difficult issue of determining whether
6. Under section 2-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, goods are defined as "all
things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale." U.C.C. § 2-103
(2006).
7. Id. § 2-102.
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software transactions were licenses, sales, or something else entirely.8
In fact, the Principles state that they apply "regardless of whether,
under previous interpretations, the transaction constituted a sale or
license, or whether software is a good or an intangible."'9 I suspect that
one of the reasons for excluding digital content was that the license
label may apply more comfortably to digital content than to "software"
as defined by the drafters. By carving out digital content from the
scope of the Principles, the drafters may have hoped to avoid having to
determine whether software is licensed or sold.'" The drafters state:
[T]he Principles should apply to all software agreements supported by a
consideration, including licenses, sales, and access contracts. To some
extent, this approach eliminates heretofore contentious debates over the
characterization of a transaction, and the resulting implications. For
example, the application and reach of these Principles should not
depend on whether a transferor labels a transaction a sale or a license."
By dodging the license versus sale bullet, however, the drafters may
have run into a classification land mine.
A. Software and Digital Content Defined
The Principles apply to "agreements for the transfer of software
for a consideration. Software agreements include agreements to sell,
lease, license, access, or otherwise transfer or share software."'2
The Principles define software as follows:
(j) Software
(1) "Software" consists of statements or instructions that are executed
by a computer to produce a certain result.
(2) Software does not include digital content, but does include a
digital-content player.
As noted in the Introduction, the Principles define digital content as
follows:
(f) Digital Content
"Digital content" consists of"digital art" or a "digital database."
8. Elsewhere, I have argued that mass consumer software offerings are sold, not
licensed, and that the issues arising in these transactions differ from those arising in
transactions where software is actually licensed and contract terms negotiated. See genemlly
Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1103.
9. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, introductory cmt.
10. Another reason may have been that "software:' as defined in the Principles, is
copyrightable subject matter whereas databases generally are not. This issue is discussed
further in Part Ill.
11. ALl s, supra note 1, ch. 1, definitions, scope, general terms.
12. Id. § 1.06.
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(1) "Digital art" is literary and artistic information stored
electronically, such as music, photographs, motion pictures,
books, newspapers, and other images and sounds.
(2) A "digital database" is a compilation of facts arranged in a
systematic manner and stored electronically. A digital database
does not include digital art.'
Although it excludes digital content, the definition of software does
include a "digital-content player."'" A digital-content player "consists
of software that renders digital content visible, audible, or otherwise
perceivable."'5 The drafters explain that the exclusion of digital content
is justified because the "software community rarely conceives of
software as referring to nonliterary and nonartistic factual data stored
electronically."' 6
The drafters acknowledge that "software sometimes encompasses
digital art"'7 but that digital art is distinguished from software because
it does not perform a "utilitarian function."'8 The important distinction
between digital content and software thus seems to be that software is
"digital information performing a utilitarian function."'9
B. Reasons for the Exclusion ofDigital Content from the Scope of
the Principles andArguments Against Those Reasons
The Principles explain that digital content was excluded from its
scope because software is different. Software is different because:
(1) it is a mixture of expressive art and utilitarian invention and does
not fit comfortably within any category of intellectual property,
(2) large amounts of resources are used to create software, (3) it is
susceptible to easy copying and distribution, (4) unique engineering
challenges are associated with software, (5) it often comprises part of
the architecture of a network," and (6) lawmakers have already
addressed copyright issues associated with digital content.'
Furthermore, there was a practical aspect to the drafters' decision to
13. Id. § 1.01.
14. Id. § 1.01(j).
15. Id. § 1.01(g).




20. Id. ch. 1 (definitions, scope, general terms).
21. Id.
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exclude digital content: to include digital art and digital databases
would have meant involving those industries in the project.22
It is unclear why some of the aforementioned qualities of
software would necessitate excluding digital content. For example,
there is no reason to presume that more resources are expended on
software products than on products containing digital content.
Furthermore, software and digital content are both reproducible. Even
if the drafters had good reasons for distinguishing digital content from
software (such as federal legislation pertaining to digital content but
not software), relevant provisions could have been drafted in such a
way as to provide exceptions. While there are differences between
digital content and software, those differences do not dictate the
exclusion of digital content from the scope of the Principles. The
Principles provide a mode of analysis or guidelines, not rules or a
restatement of the law. The provisions and accompanying comments
contain multifactor tests23 and terms that are expansive and flexible
enough to accommodate transactions involving both digital content
and software."
Software, as defined by the Principles, is copyrightable subject
matter.25 Under the Copyright Act, a 'computer program' is a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result."26 It is probably no
coincidence that this definition is substantially similar to the definition
of software under the Principles. Digital databases, on the other hand,
may not be copyrightable subject matter 8 (even though digital art can
be).
22. See id. The exclusion of these industries for the sake of expediency may be the
best reason to exclude digital content.
23. Seeid § 1.09 cmt. c.
24. See discussion in/fa Part III.
25. SeeApple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 E2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983) (finding that a "computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a
'literary work' and is protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or source
code version") (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he copyrightability of computer programs is firmly
established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act."); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 1, § 1.09 cmt. a ("Software is clearly copyrightable subject matter, and decisions of the
Federal Circuit indicate that it regards software as patentable subject matter.").
26. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2006).
27. ALl PRINCIPLES, supm note 1, § 1.010).
28. The United States Supreme Court held that information in a phone directory was
not copyrightable because it lacked originality. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 E3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir.
1996) ("After Feis; a simple alphabetical list of a firm's customers, with address and
telephone numbers, could not be protected by copyright."). The original arrangement or
1600 [Vol. 84:1595
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At first glance, the absence of copyright protection for some
database products might seem to mean that the contracting issues are
vastly different for database providers and software providers. As the
comments to the Principles note, contractual terms that purport to
restrict dissemination of fact-based databases may be vulnerable to
preemption because they purport to grant database providers
copyright-like rights.29 A closer look, however, reveals that the lack of
copyright protection for database products should not necessarily
exclude them from the scope of the Principles. In fact, the Principles
acknowledge that database providers, who do not receive the benefits
of copyright protection, may be in a precarious situation if they market
a "fact-based product that is expensive to create but also easily copied
once made available."'3  Thus a "term restricting copying or
distribution of factual information may be reasonable under the
circumstances."3' In evaluating a specific provision for preemption
purposes, the Principles provide the following test:
(1) whether the agreement effectively expands the scope of the
transferor's rights or contracts the scope of the transferee's rights
to its own creations under federal law;
(2) whether the agreement was negotiated and the parties' relative
bargaining power;
(3) the degree to which enforcement of the provision is likely to
affect competition adversely; and
(4) the degree to which enforcement of the provision is likely to
affect innovation adversely.2
Not surprisingly, these factors would seem to prove quite helpful in
determining whether a contractual term in a license provided by a
database provider was preempted, something that the Principles readily
admit.33
presentation of facts may be copyrightable. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, ch. 1,
definitions, scope, general terms. ("[Liegal issues pertaining to the appropriate interface
between ownership of databases and user rights abound. Some issues are clearly the domain
of copyright law. For example, pure facts cannot be copyrighted, but a compiler who selects
and/or arranges data in an original way can copyright the original aspect of the collection."
(footnotes omitted)).
29. ALl PRINCIPLES, supm note 1, § 1.09, reporters' notes.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id § 1.09 cmt. c.
33. Id. § 1.09, reporters' notes ("Although digital databases are outside the scope of
these Principles, courts may nevertheless find that the multifactor test discussed here helpful
in addressing a preemption challenge to restrictions in a digital-database agreement.").
2010] 1601
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Preemption issues often arise in software transactions. Software
contracts typically include terms that characterize the nature of the
transaction as a "license" rather than a sale. A purported licensing of
mass market software to a consumer means that the "first sale"
doctrine does not apply to the transaction.' The first sale doctrine
imposes significant limitations on a copyright owner's exclusive right
to distribute." Furthermore, an owner (as opposed to a licensee) of a
copy of a software program can make or authorize the creation of
another copy as an "essential step" in the utilization of that program or
for archival purposes.36 A mere licensee would not be able to take
advantage of this fair-use provision. As a general matter, software
"license" agreements typically include a provision prohibiting reverse
engineering."
Many commentators have argued that contractual provisions that
restrict or prohibit uses expressly permitted under federal law, such as
the Copyright Act, may be preempted, 8 although several courts have
disagreed. 9 The Principles address the sticky preemption problem in
section 1.09 as follows:
A term of an agreement is unenforceable if it (a) conflicts with a
mandatory rule of federal intellectual property law, (b) conflicts
impermissibly with the purposes and policies of federal intellectual
34. Kim, supia note 8, at 1110-13 (discussing the implications of a transaction being
a license versus a sale).
35. 17 U.S.C § 109(a) (2006).
36. Id. § 117(a)(1)-(2).
37. See, e.g., Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition (Retail) End-User License
Agreement for Microsoft Software (June 1, 2004), http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/
eula/home.mspx ("You may not reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble the Software,
except and only to the extent that such activity is expressly permitted by applicable law
notwithstanding this limitation.").
38. See Dennis S. Kaijala, Federal Preemption of Shnnkwrap and On-Line Licenses,
22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 512, 525 (1997) ("[T]he preemption question is complex."); Mark A.
Lemley, Beyond Preemption.- The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87
CAL. L. REv. 111, 138-51 (1999) (outlining the preemptive scope and problems of different
federal intellectual property statutes); Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copynght Contracts,
Preemption, and the Structure ofCopynght Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVjs L. RE. 45 (2007)
(arguing that provisions that limit fair use should be preempted); cf Christina Bohannan,
Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. REv. 616, 629 (2008) (arguing against
categorical approaches to preemption of contracts).
39. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 E3d 1317, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding that the Copyright Act does not preempt contractual provision prohibiting reverse
engineering); Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 E Supp. 2d 1164, 1174-75 (ED.
Mo. 2004) (finding no preemption because contract creates right not existing under copyright
law).
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property law, or (c) would constitute federal intellectual property
misuse in an infringement proceeding."
The Principles express an openness to applying preemption
analysis to contracts cases in certain situations:
Although neither [patent nor copyright] law preempts the enforcement
of a breach-of-contract cause of action as a general matter, both
copyright and patent law may refuse to enforce particular terms under a
preemption analysis.... Whether a particular contract conflicts with
federal intellectual property law or policy depends on its terms.4'
The comments accompanying the section indicate that the
Principles disagree with case law regarding whether federal intellectual
property law preempts or prohibits certain contractual terms. In a
comment addressing intellectual property misuse, the Principles note
that
when a claim in breach of contract is brought, courts should refuse to
enforce any provision in the agreement that would have been
considered misuse had the action been one for infringement.... This
places the Principles at odds with the case law addressing this issue.
The court in one case found that the particular terms did not constitute
misuse, but also stated its reluctance to apply misuse as a defense to a
contract claim because it is customarily a defense only in infringement
proceedings. Another court indicated its reluctance to expand the
doctrine beyond its traditional use as a defense to an infringement
claim. As a matter of policy, however, the Principles' position is quite
sensible.42
The Principles' approach, in the area of preemption as well as other
areas, is not only sensible but flexible enough to apply to both software
and digital content.
III. WHY THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES SHOULD INCLUDE DIGITAL
CONTENT
Digital content and software share similar characteristics and
often operate in a mutually dependent manner. As a practical matter,
software is often considered a subset of digital content if it is even
considered and distinguished by the consumer at all."3 For example, in
40. ALl PRINCIPLES, supM note 1, § 1.09.
41. Id § 1.09 cmt. a.
42. Id. § 1.09 cmt. d.
43. A quick online search uncovered several Web sites that used the term "digital
content" to describe software. See, e.g., Mitch Bettis, Quick Query: Selling Digital Content
via Major Retailers (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/440-
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a player's mind, the content of an electronic game is not independent
from the software (or "digital content player") that makes the content
viewable. Similarly, while a reader may distinguish a Kindle from an
e-book, he or she probably does not think about the words separately
from the software that enables the words to be displayed. Wikipedia
defines "computer software" as the "general term primarily used for
digitally stored data such as computer programs and other kinds of
information read and written by computers. Today, this includes data
that has not traditionally been associated with computers, such as film,
tapes and records." Wikipedia includes "video games (except the
hardware part)" and "websites" as examples of software.45
Limiting the scope of the Principles to "software" and expressly
defining software to exclude digital content is likely to result in
classification confusion. As previously mentioned, the term"classification confusion" refers to the difficulty with clearly
characterizing information as either "digital content" or "software."
Ironically, the Principles project, in large part, was inspired by
classification confusion regarding whether software transactions were
sales or licenses. The drafters note that "[a]s courts treat the matter,
the nature of the parties' federal intellectual property rights turns in
part on resolution of this classification issue. In addition, is software a
good or an intangible?"' The exclusion of digital content from the
definition of software threatens to impair the effort to create a unified
approach. This exclusion raises classification confusion issues that
muddy the applicability and relevance of the Principles.
A. Digital Content and Software Share Similar Charactefistics
Given the unique characteristics of software-its malleability,
reproducibility, and vulnerability-software producers developed
shrinkwrap agreements to protect their products. Many courts,
recognizing the business needs of the then-fledgling software industry,
accepted these contracting forms even though they contorted
Quick-Query-Selling-Digital-Content-Via-Major-Retailers (describing Protexis as "a
company that links retail outlets with companies wanting to sell digital content such as
software, music, video, e-books and other digital products"); Digital Shop, http://www.my
webmymail.com/?q=content/digital-shop (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that with "the
Digital Shop PHP script you can sell digital content such as software, scripts, music, ebooks,
documents, photos or videos online").
44. Computer Software, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer-software (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010) (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, introductory cmt.
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traditional contract doctrine. Shrinkwrap agreements paved the way
for clickwrap and browsewrap agreements. While software producers
have legitimate concerns pertaining to the vulnerabilities of software,
they have exploited the form of wrap agreements to include onerous,
one-sided terms. The Principles address many of the challenges
presented by these novel contracting forms.47 They acknowledge that
some consumer protection laws that may be appropriate for other
products are not appropriate for software. For example, cooling-off
periods may not be appropriate for software transactions because
transferees may download software and then return it.48 Yet the
Principles also acknowledge that software producers can create a"situation-specific monopoly" that raises issues of bargaining power.
Additionally, wrap agreements can be manipulated to deflect attention
from the terms of the agreement.49
Courts that apply the Principles in addressing issues of
contractual assent in the context of software will likely apply legal
precedent to cases involving digital content. While wrap agreements
addressed a need specific to the software industry, the precedential
effect of these decisions was not limited to software. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in Hill v
Gateway, "Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCDto software, but where's the
sense in that? ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of
software.""° Especially given the similarities between digital content
and software, the courts are likely to focus on the manner of
contracting rather than the character of the digital information that is
the subject of the contract.
The need for the Principles project arose because the law
governing hard goods was inadequate to address software.' The
speed, reproducibility, storage capabilities, and inspection and quality
control issues surrounding software differed from those involving hard
goods. 2 Like software, digital content also differs from hard goods. It
is easily reproducible, readily distributable, and rapidly evolving. In
fact, software is usually distinguished not from digital content, but
47. See id § 2.02. This applies to standard form transfers of generally available
software and enforcement of the standard form, which considers how to address issues
unique to transfers of digital information.
48. Id. ch. 2, formation and enforcement.
49. Id.
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from hardware." We are only just beginning to see the many ways in
which digital content can be packaged and delivered to consumers.
From the average consumer's perspective, digital content is
indistinguishable from the software that launches it. From the
producer's perspective, software and digital content may be
distinguishable during development and manufacture, but they become
one product when that product is marketed and sold to the consumer.
B. Digital Content Is Often Bundled with Software
Further complicating matters, digital content is often bundled
with embedded software in multimedia products. The Principles
include embedded software in their scope:
Section 1.07 Scope; Embedded Software
(a) Subject to section 1.06, these Principles apply to agreements for
the transfer of software embedded in goods if a reasonable
transferor would believe the transferee's predominate purpose for
engaging in the transfer is to obtain the software."
The comments clarify that the "predominate purpose" test "focuses on
the transferee's purpose for entering the transaction. The predominate
purpose is the most important purpose for entering the transaction."55
The comments set forth the following factors to consider in
determining the predominant purpose:
the language of the agreement; the nature of the goods and the
software; the price of the goods and the software ... the nature of the
parties' bargaining over the goods and the software ... the ease of
copying and transferring the embedded software; the general
availability of the software on the market; whether there is a separate
price for the software; and whether the transferor developed the
software for the particular transferee or the particular product. No
particular factor is controlling.56
The comments address the issue of multimedia products as
follows:
If the software is embedded in a game console, for example, this
Section applies to determine whether these Principles apply. Some
53. For example, the Random House Dictionary (2010) defines software as "the
programs and instructions that run a computer, as opposed to the actual physical machinery
and devices that compose the hardware," available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
software (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
54. ALI PRINCIPLES, supm note 1, § 1.07.
55. Id. § 1.07 cmt. b.
56. Id § 1.07(b).
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factors for determining the transferee's predominant purpose in the
game-console context may suggest that the Principles do not apply. For
example, the language of the agreement usually does not describe the
transaction as a transfer of software. In addition, some transferees
obtain a game primarily for the entertainment value embodied in the
game's digital content, not for the functionality of the software. Further,
transferees often cannot select the embedded software nor can they
acquire the software separately on the market. In addition, the software
is often not easy to copy or transfer. 7
The relevant factors, however, can be easily manipulated. Producers
wishing to avoid the effect of the Principles can change the wording of
their agreements to license "digital content" rather than software.
Transferees wishing to take advantage of the Principles could claim
that the software-and not the content of the game-was the reason
for the purchase. Game manufacturers can easily tweak existing
products to fall within the purview of the Principles or wriggle out of
their reach.
The Principles state that in the case of a mixed transaction, the
court should determine whether the predominate purpose of the
transaction was software or digital content:
Section 1.08 Scope; Mixed Transfers Including Non-Embedded
Software
(a) For purposes of this section,
(1) "goods" include any embedded software, and
(2) a "mixed transfer" constitutes a single transaction that
consists of the transfer of non-embedded software and any
combination of goods, digital content, and services.
(b) Subject to section 1.06, in the case of an agreement for a mixed
transfer, these Principles apply to the transfer of the non-
embedded software unless the transfer also includes digital
content or services and a reasonable transferor would believe the
transferee's predominate purpose for engaging in the transfer is to
obtain the digital content or services."
The comments acknowledge a "line-drawing" problem in using factors
to determine the outcome in individual cases but claim that "this is no
different from the challenge of applying the predominate-purpose test
in ... mixed sale-of-goods and services cases, something that courts
have been doing successfully for many years under Article 2 of the
UC.C." 9 On the contrary, the line-drawing problem here is actually
57. Id § 1.07 cmt. d.
58. Id. § 1.08.
59. Id § 1.08 cmt. b.
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much more difficult because it requires a court to evaluate the
characteristics of the subject matter. "Software" and "digital content"
are much more similar and difficult to distinguish than "services" and"goods." The predominate purpose test thus requires courts to
determine not only the "purpose" of the transaction but also the nature
of the thing being transferred.
C Reduces Judi'cialDiscretion and Uncertainty
The comments suggest that even where the Principles do not
technically apply under the predominate purpose test, courts can apply
the Principles by analogy "when the reasoning behind these Principles
applies persuasively to such transfers."'6  In other words, in cases
involving digital content, the Principles leave to the courts the difficult
tasks of (1) distinguishing digital content from software,
(2) identifying the "predominate purpose" of the transaction, and
(3) determining whether the reasoning underlying the Principles
justifies their application in an individual case.
The drafters of the Principles justify carving out digital content
from software because they claim that the software community does
so. I am skeptical that there is such a consensus view in the software
community or that such a cohesive community exists.6" Even
assuming that the software community recognizes this distinction, its
members are not responsible for determining whether a given case
involves "software" or "digital content." Rather, this is the task of
attorneys and judges. Currently, there is no consensus in the legal
community that digital content is distinguishable from software. For
example, ProCD v Zeidenberg is generally regarded as the first major
case to recognize the use of shrinkwraps to license software; yet the
case actually involved "digital databases" (not software) under the
definitions set forth in the Principles.62
60. Id. § 1.08 cmt. d.
61. The Free On-line Dictionary of Computing notes:
Software ... does not usually include the data processed by programs unless this is
in a format such as multimedia which depends on the use of computers for its
presentation. This distinction becomes unclear in cases such as spread sheets
which can contain both instructions (formulae and macros) and data .... Some
claim that documentation (both paper and electronic) is also software. Others go
further and define software to be programs plus documentation though this does
not correspond with common usage.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/software (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
62. 86 E3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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In ProCD, the plaintiff compiled information from telephone
directories into a computer database.63 The plaintiff sought to limit use
of the database information to "noncommercial" uses via a shrinkwrap
license.' As previously discussed, digital databases under the
Principles are not "software' " '5 Yet the Seventh Circuit framed the
issue as one involving "computer software."'6  Judge Easterbrook,
author of the opinion, recognized the difference between the"copyrighted application program" and the "data" in the product, but
did not analyze their treatment for federal preemption purposes any
differently." Cases citing to ProCD similarly reference it as one
involving "software"6 and rarely distinguish between the data and the
application program.
The Principles assume that the courts will be up to the task of
drawing lines that require technological sophistication in an
increasingly complex field. This assumption is unfounded. Instead of
taking this leap of faith, the drafters should have expressly considered
the implications of the various provisions of the Principles on digital
content rather than leaving it up to the courts. While the Principles are
not binding law, they help guide and shape the law as it develops,
before norms settle and take hold. Some courts may strategically
apply or decline to apply the Principles to digital content in order to
justify a desired outcome. The Principles then risk becoming an
instrument of rationalization rather than tools with which to reason.
IV CONCLUSION
The vulnerabilities of digital information have led to innovative
contracting solutions in the form of wrap contracts. Courts, deferring
to the business needs of software companies, have enforced these
contracts by flexibly interpreting traditional contract doctrine. Some
companies have abused the flexibility of the courts by incorporating
63. Id. at 1449.
64. Id.
65. ALI PRINCIPLES, supm note 1, § 1.01(j) and (f).
66. 86 F.3d at 1448 ("Must buyers of computer software obey the terms of
shrinkwrap licenses?").
67. Id. at 1453.
68. See, e.g., Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass'n v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 421 E3d
981, 987 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing to ProCD and referring to it as a case involving a
shrinkwrap license "on software"); Hill v. Gateway, 105 E3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[ProCD held that] terms inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software
after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by returning the product."); Spivey v.
Adaptive Mktg., 660 E Supp. 2d 940, 948 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that the defendant in
ProCD purchased "computer software" from ProCD).
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more one-sided terms. The Principles tackle many of the problematic
provisions in wrap contracts and strive to provide a cohesive and
unified approach to evaluating software contracts. The exclusion of
digital content from software, however, complicates this objective and
detracts from what makes software contracts different from other
contracts: the nature of software itself, its intangibility, its novelty, and
its reproducibility. These characteristics make software vulnerable in
ways that tangible products are not. These are also characteristics
shared by digital content. It would be a shame to let blurry lines and
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